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Prison Labor Under State Direction: 
Do Inmates Have the Right to FLSA 
Coverage and Minimum Wage? 
An increasing number of Americans are witnessing life 
through the bars of prison cells. More than 450 of every 
100,000 United States residents were confined in jails and 
prisons on any given day in 1990 . . . .' 
The federal government's "war on drugs" and other anti- 
crime measures launched in the 1980s have enjoyed some suc- 
cess. A recent F.B.I. report revealed that our nation's crime 
rate decreased from 1991 t o  1992.~ While that statistic seems 
t o  provide a glimmer of hope to crimefighters-and t o  Ameri- 
cans in general-considerable costs have accompanied the 
government's efforts to control and deter criminal activity. In 
fact, the billions of dollars spent on increased law enforcement 
and prosecution have led to billions of dollars more being spent 
on the incarceration of prisoners? As a result, the cost of 
maintaining overcrowded prisons or building new ones contin- 
ues to burden our society.4 
1. Michael Tonry, The Ballooning Prison Population, in THE 1993 WORLD 
BOOK YEAR BOOK 392, 392 (1993). 
2. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEFT OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1992: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 5 (1993) [hereinafter CRIME RE- 
PORTS]. Unfortunately, the number of reported crimes still totalled 14,438,191 dur- 
ing this same period. Id. The F.B.I.'s crime index includes reported instances of 
murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id. Not surprisingly, with 
the large number of criminal offenses still being reported annually, the number of 
arrests and subsequent prison sentences is still staggering. See generally Tonry, 
supm note 1 (describing the high rate of incarceration in the United States). 
3. Tonry, supra note 1, at 394-95. In addition to the stepped-up efforts of 
the war on drugs, harsher sentencing procedures and rising parole violations have 
also contributed to the rising prison populations. Id. at 394. 
4. Indeed, at the close of 1989, our federal prisons were already operating at 
164% of capacity. Federal Prison Industries and Implementation of the Federal 
Prison Industries Provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (testimony of J .  Michael Quinlan, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons). 
Even so, the Federal Bureau of Prisons projected that the federal inmate popula- 
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In addition to magnifying the obvious costs related to  phys- 
ical facilities, such rapid growth in the number of inmates 
creates significant management and control problems. To alle- 
viate these problems, prison managers must look for ways t o  
occupy the prisoners' time while minimizing costs. Partially in 
an attempt to achieve this, the federal and state governments 
have either encouraged or required participation in inmate 
work  program^.^ This is not a recent development. In fact, 
"[tlhroughout most of the history of the American prison sys- 
tem prisoners have worked while incarcerated.'" 
Proponents of inmate work programs claim these programs 
have proven an effective way of reducing inmate idleness.' In 
addition, prison industries and other work programs save costs 
and earn profits which can offset prison expenses. The federal 
government and some states have also used this revenue to 
help support prisoners' families and to compensate crime vic- 
t i m ~ . ~  
Despite the positive aspects of prison labor, the goods and 
services sold by prison industries necessarily take a share of 
the market from related businesses in the private sector. Some 
question whether prison industries and private industries com- 
pete on a level playing field, especially since inmate laborers 
traditionally receive wages well below the state and federal 
 minimum^.^ Others charge that, in addition to giving an unfair 
advantage to  prison industries competing in the market place, 
tion would nearly double by 1995. Id. The trends of state and local correctional 
institutions appear to be following suit. In 1991, state prisons operated at 131% of 
capacity, with some states, such as California and New Jersey, operating above 
151% of capacity. Tonry, supra note 1, at  394-95. 
5. See, e.g., A m .  REV. STAT. ANN. 8 31-251(A) (1992) (granting state prison 
official authority to require hard labor from prisoners); UTAH CODE ANN. 8 64-13- 
16 (1992) (allowing state department to employ any inmate not otherwise incapable 
of employment). 
6. Abstract, The Modern Prison: Let's Make It a Factory for Change, 18 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 51, 51 (1986). 
7. Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (testimony of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier). 
8. Id. at 1. Prison labor serves other purposes as well. For example, some 
see mandatory labor as a form of punishment, while others see it as a means of 
rehabilitation. Josephine R. Potuto, The Modern Prison: Let's Make It a Factory for 
Change, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 51, 51 (1986). Such work programs can aid by teach- 
ing inmates responsibility and other useful skills, hopefully facilitating the inmate's 
return to society. See GAIL S. FUNKE ET AL., kk3SETS AND LIABILITIES OF CORREC- 
TIONAL INDUSTRIES 7 (1982). 
9. See FUNKE ET AL., supra note 8, at  14-16. Indeed, remuneration some- 
times came in the form of "good time" (reduced prison sentences) rather than as 
wages at  all. Id. 
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such treatment also unfairly discriminates against inmate 
workers. 
In light of such arguments, some maintain that the time 
has arrived to recognize prisoners as "employees" covered by 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act).'' In  fact, a panel 
of judges from the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that the Arizo- 
na  Correctional Industries should pay inmates minimum wages 
according to provisions of the FLSA." This decision implied, if 
not expressly held, that inmates working for and in behalf of 
the prison were state employees, entitled to FLSA coverage. 
However, when the case was reheard en banc, the Ninth Cir- 
cuit refused to follow the panel decision.12 
Nevertheless, a trend may be emerging. Although most 
courts recently addressing the issue have agreed that inmates 
should not be considered employees for purposes of the Act,13 
no court since 1984 has categorically ruled out the possibility of 
FLSA coverage for working prisoners. Congress and the Su- 
preme Court have left no clear roadmap to guide the courts. 
How should the courts treat working inmates? Should FLSA 
coverage be extended to them? If so, in what situations should 
they be covered? Did Congress intend such a n  application of 
the FLSA? If not, would Congress a t  least approve? 
This Comment attempts to answer these questions. Part I1 
sets forth a brief history of the FLSA and traces the develop- 
ment of FLSA coverage of prisoners. Parts I11 and IV analyze 
Hale v. Arizona 1,14 Hale v. Arizona 11,15 and Vanskike v. Pe- 
p p- 
lo.  29 U.S.C. $5 201-219 (1988). 
11. Hale v. Arizona, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 
1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993). The 1992 Ninth Cir- 
cuit opinion will hereinafter be referred to as Hale I, and the 1993 Ninth Circuit 
opinion will be referred to as Hale II. 
12. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1389. 
13. See Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.) (inmate not cov- 
ered by FLSA), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 238 (1993); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 
806 (7th Cir. 1992) (prisoners not entitled to minimum wage under FLSA), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.) (prisoners 
not "employees* under FLSA), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 666 (1992); Gilbreath v. 
Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1991) (Arizona Department of Cor- 
rections not "employer* under FLSA). But see Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(inmates working in state work programs considered "employees* of the state), reu'd 
on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993). 
14. 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993). 
15. 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
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ters,16 three recent opinions which consider arguments for and 
against extending FLSA coverage to prisoners. Part V examines 
the language and purposes of the Act as well as competing 
public policy concerns in attempting to discern Congress's in- 
tent toward prisoners. Part VI proposes a new test for the 
courts to apply in determining the "economic reality" of em- 
ployer-employee relations. Finally, this Comment concludes 
that  the FLSA should not be extended to cover prisoners since 
Congress did not intend such coverage and would likely not 
approve such action, which undermines public policy regarding 
the incarceration of criminals, and because the courts have not 
yet adequately addressed the "economic reality" of working 
prisoners. 
11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLSA COVERAGE OF PRISONERS 
Some scholars recognize the FLSA as "the original anti- 
poverty law."17 As originally passed in 1938, the FLSA was an 
attempt to combat the ill effects of the Great Depression." 
Indeed, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
reiterated this same thought nearly thirty years later: 
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 to meet 
the economic and social problems of that era. Low wages, long 
working hours and high unemployment plagued the Nation, 
which was then in the midst of an unprecedented depression. 
The policy of the act, as set forth therein, was to correct and 
as rapidly as practicable to eliminate labor conditions detri- 
mental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of 
workers. l9 
By establishing a minimum wage, Congress hoped to raise the 
standard of living of low-wage workers and to increase their 
purchasing power.20 By requiring increased pay for overtime 
16. 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993). 
17. Robert N. Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 607, 607 (1972). 
18. JAMES LEDVINKA, FEDERAL REGULATION OF PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RE- 
SOURCE MANAGEMENT 249 (1982); CHARLES H. LIVENGOOD, JR., THE FEDERAL WAGE 
AND HOUR LAW 6-7 (1951); Willis, supra note 17, a t  607. The Supreme Court up- 
held the constitutionality of the FLSA in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(194 1). 
19. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
AMENDMENTS OF 1966, S. REP. NO. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966). 
20. LEDVINKA, supra note 18, at 249. 
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hours, Congress hoped to  reduce unemployment by making it 
less expensive for employers to hire additional employees than 
t o  overwork existing ones." Finally, Congress believed the Act 
would reduce labor disputes by increasing compensation in low- 
paying jobs and cutting down long work days." 
In fact, many of these same purposes remain part of the 
FLSA today. Section 202 declares: 
(a) The Congress finds that the existence . . . of labor 
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum 
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general 
well-being of workers (1) causes . . . the channels and instru- 
mentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate 
such labor conditions among [American] workers . . . ; (2) 
burdens commerce . . . ; (3) constitutes an unfair .method of 
competition . . . ; (4) leads to labor disputes . . . ; and (5) in- 
terferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in com- 
merce. . . . 
(b) It  is declared to be the policy of this chapter . . . to 
correct and as  rapidly as  practicable to eliminate the condi- 
tions above referred to in such industries without substantial- 
ly curtailing employment or earning power.23 
Though these problems certainly do not stifle the economy as 
severely today as they did during the Great Depression, schol- 
ars stress the importance the FLSA's enumerated purposes 
have played in the Act's interpretation and subsequent amend- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ~  
Originally, the FLSA covered less than thirty-three percent 
of the nation's work While the Act affected less than 
twelve percent of those initially covered, it still increased the 
wages of roughly 200,000 employees.26 Also, nearly 1,400,000 
workers benefitted from shorter work weeks or overtime 
pay.'? 
Since 1938, amendments to the FLSA have served primari- 
ly to broaden its coverage. The most substantial inclusion of 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. 29 U.S.C. 5 202 (1988). 
24. LEDVINKA, supra note 18, at 249; LIVENGOOD, supra note 18, at 7. 
25. LEDVINKA, supra note 18, at 249. 
26. MARY ANNE Q. WOOD ET AL., FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND STAN- 
DARDS 591 (1982). 
27. Id. (citing William S .  Tyson, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: A 
Survey and Evaluation of the First Eleven Years, 1 LAB. L.J. 278 (1950)). 
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previously excluded workers came in 1974, when Congress 
extended coverage to almost all state and local government 
 employee^.'^ Presumably, the FLSA now covers all employees 
unless Congress has specifically made such workers "exempty' 
in  another section of the Act.Zg However, in spite of this pre- 
sumption, most courts have held the FLSA inapplicable to 
inmates. And despite numerous amendments to encompass 
more workers within the Act, Congress has yet to specifically 
address the situation of inmate workers. This has left the 
courts to debate the coverage of this overlooked labor class, 
relying on general presumptions regarding the FLSA and the 
employer-employee relationship. 
A. Traditional Refusal of Courts to 
Acknowledge Inmates as Employees 
Since the FLSA's passage in 1938, the Act has provoked 
endless litigation by employers and employees alike. As a re- 
sult, substantial case law now supplements and interprets the 
Act and its amendments. Even so, debate regarding the defini- 
tion of the employer-employee relationship continues. The Su- 
preme Court has offered only general guidance, holding in 1961 
that  the coverage of any given relationship hinges on the "eco- 
nomic reality" of the employment s i t~at ion.~ '  
Still, for more than fifty years workers in various employ- 
ment situations have sought judicial declarations of "covered" 
status under the Act. While the courts have been receptive to 
28. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 6(a), 
$ 3, 88 Stat. 55, 59-60 (codified at 29 U.S.C. fj 203). The Court, however, held the 
1974 amendments unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976). When the Court overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), Congress quickly acted to again include 
state employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 
99 Stat. 787. 
29. See 29 U.S.C. $ 213 (1988) (providing an "exemption" from the minimum 
wage provision for certain common employment situations, such as school teachers, 
outdoor salesmen, babysitters, etc.); 29 U.S.C. fj 214 (1988) (providing special "ex- 
emptions" from minimum wages for learners, apprentices, messengers, etc.). The 
Supreme Court has reasoned that "[sluch specificity in stating exemptions 
strengthens the implication that employees not thus exempted . . . remain within 
the Act." Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950). 
30. Goldberg v. W t a k e r  House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). Since 
this decision, courts have applied "economic reality" as the general legal standard. 
See, e.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 1303 (1993); Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 
F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993). 
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many arguments in behalf of workers, they have traditionally 
been reluctant to hold working prisoners in the same category 
as other more "typical" classes of workers. 
In  1948, Huntley v. Gunn Furniture CO.~' became the first 
federal court opinion to address the issue of prisoners' rights 
under the FLSA. On March 11, 1947, a group of inmates at the 
State Prison of Southern Michigan filed a complaint seeking to 
recover minimum wages and overtime compen~at ion .~~ Prison 
officials had assigned the inmates to work on parts and assem- 
blies of shell casings, which Gunn Furniture Co. (Gunn) then 
supplied to the Ordnance Division of the United States War 
D e ~ a r t m e n t . ~ ~  Judge Starr rested the opinion on the fact that 
no employment or compensatory contract existed between the 
prisoners and Gum: 
"It is difficult to conceive instances wherein an industrial 
plant . . . 'suffers or permits to work' within the meaning of 
the Act, employees with whom the plant has no contractual 
relationship as employer and employee or as master and 
servant."34 
The court held that the inmates were not employees of GUM 
within the meaning of the Act; instead, they were employees of 
the Michigan prison i n d u s t r i e ~ . ~ ~  
In 1971, the Sixth Circuit dealt a major blow to inmates' 
hopes for recognition under the FLSA. In  Sims v. Parke Davis 
& Co.,S6 the appellate court denied the inmates the right to 
recover minimum wages and other damages under the FLSA. 
Instead, the court affirmed and adopted the district court's "de- 
tailed and comprehensive opinion."37 
In  Sims, Parke Davis & Co. (Parke Davis) and Upjohn Co. 
(Upjohn) conducted clinical research on the prison  premise^.^' 
The inmates performed services for these companies, including 
31. 79 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1948). 
32. Id. at  111. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at  115 (quoting Maddox v. Jones, 42 F. Supp. 35, 42 (N.D. Ala. 
1940)). 
35. Id. at 116. The court also rejected the prisoners' claim under an unjust 
enrichment theory: "[Tlo invoke meruit] in the present case for the sole 
purpose of labelling the plaintiffs as 'employees' of defendant under the Act would 
extend the doctrine and legal fiction beyond reason." Id. at  114. 
36. 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). 
37. Id. at 1259. 
38. Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 778 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
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janitorial duties, maintenance and repair work, clerical tasks, 
and cooking.3g The district court examined the "economic real- 
ity" of the inmates' working relationship with Parke Davis and 
Upjohn by considering "the extent to which [the companies 
could] hire, fire and control those  inmate^.'"^ The court con- 
cluded that the inmates did not qualify as employees of Parke 
Davis or Upjohn: 
The economic reality is that plaintiffs are convicted crim- 
inals incarcerated in a state penitentiary. As state prisoners, 
they have been assigned by prison officials to work on ,the 
penitentiary premises for private corporations a t  rates estab- 
lished and paid by the State. In return for the use of this 
convict labor, the private corporations have relinquished their 
normal rights: [i.e., the rights to hire, fire, or control the in- 
mates] except in the most routine rnatter~.~'  
Accordingly, the court found that the prison's control over the 
inmates precluded the inmates from being employees of a pri- 
vate corporation. 
Additionally, the dicta in Sims appeared even more damag- 
ing to inmate labor rights. The court clearly did not believe 
that Congress intended FLSA coverage for inmates: 
The setting of wages for incarcerated prisoners working on 
assignment by prison officials requires the consideration of 
many variables which are unique to that situation and which 
directly affect government policy on rehabilitation of crimi- 
nals. I t  is unlikely that Congress considered any of those 
variables at  the time i t  adopted general legislation designed 
to give employees the right to a subsistence wage."2 
Subsequent cases over the next twelve years continued to  
deny prisoners FLSA protection. Most often, the courts would 
find that the "economic reality" identified the state or federal 
government, not the private corporations, as the inmates' "em- 
ployer." This was usually not difficult for the courts to justify 
because of the extensive control exercised by prison officials 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 783. 
41. Id. at 787. 
42. Id. 
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over working prisoners.43 Such a showing ended a plaintiff's 
cause of action.44 
The Supreme Court never heard any of these controversies. 
Even so, several of the circuits took turns cutting down inmate 
claims. The courts would typically apply the same rationale as 
in Sims, while continuing to  express doubts as to Congress's 
intent toward prisoners. In Wentworth v. S ~ l e m ? ~  the Eighth 
Circuit proclaimed doubt that "Congress, [even] by the 1974 
amendments, intended to extend the coverage of the minimum 
wage law to convicts working in state prison ind~stries.'"~ 
Just six years later, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's 
conclusion that inmates were not covered by the FLSA in part 
because "the Congressional concern in enacting the Act was 
with the standard of living and general well-being of the work- 
er in American industry, so that the extension to the prison 
inmate was not legislatively ~ontemplated."~' 
Nevertheless, after 1983, some courts began to apply a 
different rationale for determining the "economic reality" of the 
inmate-worker situation. Indeed, a refined test has proved 
much more favorable to the inmates than the traditional ratio- 
nale. This test, established in Bonnette v. California Health & 
Welfare Agency:' still has vitality in several of the federal 
circuits today. 
B. Developments Since the Advent of the Bonnette Test 
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit combined a number of general- 
ized inquiries previously considered by other courts in deter- 
mining the "economic reality" of working  relationship^.^^ The 
43. In some cases, the inmate plaintiffs would even name a government agen- 
cy as the defendant. See Sprouse v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 480 F.2d 1, 3 (5th 
Cir.) (holding that "a suit against an essentially non-proprietary government corpo- 
ration is in essence a suit against the United States"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095 
(1973). 
44. At that time, Congress still had not extended the FLSA to government 
employees-at least not successfblly. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
45. 548 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1977). 
46. Id. at  775. 
47. Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 721 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1983). The court also 
held that "there was no employer-employee relationship, because the inmates' labor 
belonged to the penitentiary, which was the sole party to the contract with Sara." 
Id. 
' 48. 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). 
49. Id.; see, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 756 
(9th Cir. 1979); Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of MeAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237-38 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973). 
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result was a more bright-line test for the courts, reducing the 
need for a purely discretionary case-by-case analysis. Specifical- 
ly, the courts would determine "whether the alleged employer 
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised 
and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of em- 
ployment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and 
(4) maintained employment records."50 Nevertheless, the court 
cautioned that these "four factors . . . are not etched in  stone 
and will not be blindly applied. The ultimate determination 
must be based 'upon the circumstances of the whole activi- 
ty 0' "5 l 
Bonnette only involved "chore workers" in a state welfare 
program.52 Even so, courts quickly began to adopt the 
Bonnette standard for other determinations of "economic reali- 
ty" under the FLSA. A year after Bonnette, the Second Circuit 
became the first court to apply the test in an  inmate labor 
situation. 
In  Carter v. Dutchess Community College:3 a New York 
inmate (Carter) had worked in the prison as a teaching assis- 
tant  for a local college.54 Carter conducted tutorial classes in  
business math for inmate students. For his work, Carter re- 
ceived wages well below the statutory minimum.55 The lower 
court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the 
ground that the prison officials, and not the college, had the 
ultimate control over Carter.56 Against tradition, the Second 
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that "ultimate control" 
was not the sole dispositive f ac t~ r .~ '  Instead, the court applied 
the Bonnette test, stating that "an inmate may be entitled un- 
der the law to receive the federal minimum wage from an out- 
side employer, depending on how many typical employer pre- 
rogatives are exercised over the inmate by the outside employ- 
er, and to what extent."58 
50. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. 
51. Id. (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)). 
52. Id. at 1467. 
53. 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984). 
54. Id. at 10. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 11-12. 
57. Id. at 13-14. 
58. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Carter was decided before the 1985 
amendments to the FLSA, therefore, the states were not yet subject to the FLSA 
provisions. Even so, the Carter court seemed reluctant to go beyond granting FLSA 
coverage for prisoners working for "outside" employers. See id. 
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Carter represented a major reversal in the judicial trend 
which, until then, had the practical effect of absolutely preclud- 
ing inmates from FLSA coverage. Now, by satisfying the four- 
factor Bonnette test, inmates could argue that they were in fact 
employees according to "economic reality." Carter led the way 
for Watson v. Graves,sg which became the f i s t  case to actually 
grant prisoners "employee" status under the FLSA. 
In Watson, two officers (the sheriff and the warden) of a 
Louisiana parish jail operated and administered a work release 
program.60 The sheriff and warden would grant "trusty" status 
to  certain prisoners and would allow these prisoners "to work 
outside the jail for private individuals or companies.'"' This 
would occur usually at  the request of the outside parties. As 
part of the program, two inmates (Watson and Thrash) worked 
outside the prison for a small construction business operated by 
the sheriff's daughter and son-in-law (the Jarreaus). The in- 
mates worked for $20 per day regardless of the hours 
The Watson court applied the Bonnette test and found that 
the Jarreaus clearly met the supervision prong of the test.63 
The court also found that "Jarreau . . . had the de facto power 
to hire and fire" and that the "Sheriff 'set' the rate of pay."64 
The court ignored the record-keeping prong since no records 
were kept. 
Not surprisingly, the court held that Watson and Thrash 
"were 'employees' of the Jarreaus for purposes of FLSA cover- 
age."65 However, the facts of that case were unusual when 
compared with the typical on-site prisoner work program? 
The sheriff had operated the work release program to  directly 
benefit his daughter and son-in-law and had violated state 
policy regarding such programs.67 At best, Watson should be 
59. 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990). 
60. Id. at 1551. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 1554-55. 
64. Id. In fad, the Sheriff had set the pay rate illegally under Louisiana law. 
Id. at 1555. 
65. Id. at 1556. 
66. "Up to now this court believed, apparently naively, that in the last decade 
of the twentieth century scenarios such as the one before us no longer occurred in 
country or parish jails of the rural south except in the imaginations of movie or 
television script writers." Id. at 1550. 
67. Id. at 1557. The court stated that work release programs were meant to 
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narrowly read to hold that prisoners who participate in a work 
release program, completely unsupervised by prison officials, 
may be entitled to FLSA coverage. 
Since Watson, however, some courts have refused to apply 
the Bonnette test to inmate labor situations. At one point, even 
the Ninth Circuit refused to consider the Bonnette factors in 
reviewing a case of prisoners working for the state department 
of corrections. In Gilbreath u. Cutter Biological, I n ~ . , 6 ~  all 
three judges voiced a different opinion?' Judge Trott's opin- 
ion, which was adopted as the court opinion, claimed that the 
"economic reality" issue did not apply to inmates: 
A review of the FLSA in the light of its evident purpose and 
legislative history, conducted with an eye guided by common 
sense and common intelligence, leads . . . to the inescapable 
conclusion that it is highly implausible that Congress intend- 
ed the FLSA's minimum wage protection be extended to fel- 
ons serving time in prison. This is a category of persons . . . 
whose civil rights are subject to suspension and whose work 
in prison could be accurately characterized in an economic 
sense as involuntary servitude . . . ." 
Furthermore, Judge Trott concluded that the state's "complete 
control" over its inmates was inconsistent with the "economic 
reality" in a true employer-employee relati~nship.~' 
Nevertheless, several courts now seem to recognize that 
prisoners may have a right to FLSA coverage when they are 
employed in the service of private businesses. Even more eye 
catching is an emerging trend to grant prisoners a right to 
minimum wages when they work for the prison or the state. 
Judge Dorothy Nelson, who wrote a strong dissent in 
Gilbreath," commanded the majority in a 1992 case which 
held prisoners to be "employees" of the Arizona Correctional 
I n d u ~ t r i e s . ~ ~  That panel's opinion, and its possible implica- 
help inmates "earn wages with which to help support their families and pay their 
fines." Also, "a portion of the wages earned by a work release inmate [was] to be 
applied to his room and board, thereby easing the burden on the taxpayer." Id. 
The sheriffs program met none of these purposes. Id. 
68. 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1991). 
69. Id. at 1321 (Trott, J.); id. at 1328 (Rymer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1331 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. at 1324-25. 
71. Id. at 1325. 
72. Id. at 1331 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
73. Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th 
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tions are examined in Part 111. Part IV then examines a Sev- 
enth Circuit opinion7* that  seems written almost as a rebuttal 
to Hale I ,  and Hale II, the en banc rehearing by the Ninth Cir- 
cuit .75 
A. The Facts 
Hale I involved the consolidated claims of two groups of 
inmates in the Arizona Correctional Industries (ARCOR) pro- 
gram.76 One group of inmates (Fuller inmates) performed a 
wide variety of jobs in ARCOR enterprises, ranging from rais- 
ing hogs for Farmer John meats to making license plates." To 
work for ARCOR, the inmates had to apply to the program, be 
accepted by the prospective department, and pass a security 
review.78 ARCOR placed all revenues in a revolving fund from 
which it paid wages and  expense^.'^ 
The only appellant from the other inmate group (Hale 
inmates) worked as an office manager and clerk for a business 
participating in the Inmate-Operated Business Enterprise 
(IOBE) program.80 The IOBE was a division of ARCOR which 
allowed inmates to run businesses and to market goods in the 
private sector. The Department of Corrections (DOC) monitored 
the businesses and credited the inmates' accounts with the 
wages co l l e~ ted .~~  
Both groups of inmates sued to recover minimum wages 
under the FLSA and Arizona law. One lower court dismissed 
the claim of the Fuller inmates, while another court granted 
summary judgment against the Hale inmates.82 
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S .  Ct. 386 (1993). 
74. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S .  Ct. 
1303 (1993). 
75. Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
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B. The Ninth Circuit's Panel Opinion 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first upheld the applicability 
of the FLSA to states.83 The court then turned to the critical 
issue: whether the inmates were involved in an employer-em- 
ployee relationship with the state, as defined under the 
FLSA. 
The court's analysis first addressed the issue of whether 
inmates could ever be employees. In so doing, the court ex- 
pressly followed the well-settled principle requiring courts "to 
define 'employer' and 'employee' expansively and to construe 
exemptions narrowly."85 The court then recognized that Con- 
gress, in 29 U.S.C. # 213 (1988), had not specifically "exempted" 
prisoners. This, the court claimed, created a presumption that  
prisoners remained covered by the Act? 
Furthermore, the court found that "[c]onstruing the FLSA 
to include inmate workers is also consistent with the purposes 
of the Indeed, "[rlequiring that prisoners receive a min- 
imum wage for their labor [even] furthers the goal" of eliminat- 
ing "unfair competition between employers and between work- 
ers seeking employ~nent."~~ As a result of this analysis, the 
court concluded that "Congress did not intend automatically to 
exclude inmate employees from the protections of the Act."89 
The court next turned to an inquiry into whether an em- 
ployment relationship actually existed between the inmates 
and the state agency." Because Gilbreath u. Cutter Biological, 
Inc. had contained three "widely divergent views," the court in  
Hale I more or less ignored the prior opinion of Judge Trott." 
- 
83. Id. at 1361. 
84. Id. at 1362. 
85. Id. (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290, 295-96 (1985)). 
86. Id. at 1363. 
87. Id. The opinion quickly brushed over the importance of the FLSA7s pur- 
pose to provide a minimum standard of living. While most commentators consider 
that to be the primary purpose of the Act, the court in Hale I concluded that it 
was only "equally importantn with eliminating unfair competition. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 1364. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1364-66 (analyzing the three opinions and explaining away the 
court's holding (Judge Trott's opinion) in Gilbreath). Interestingly, Judge Nelson, 
who had not joined Judge Rymer's opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment in Gilbreath, actually applied Rymer's rationale in Hale I when that 
application would result in an outcome consistent with Nelson's thinking. Id. at 
1364-65. 
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Instead, the court chose to apply the four-pronged Bonnette test 
to ARCOR and the DOC.92 
Applying the test to the Fuller inmates, the court found 
that the state was responsible, through ARCOR and the DOC, 
for (1) hiring and firing the inmates, (2) supervising and con- 
trolling the work, (3) determining the rate and method of pay- 
ment, and (4) maintaining any existing employment re~ords?~ 
In the case of the Hale inmate, the court sidestepped the 
possible liability of the IOBE business, which was owned and 
operated by inmates. Instead, the court reverted to a tradition- 
al standard and held that the state had "effective" or "ultimate" 
control over hiring and firing, supervising, and paying the 
inmates through ARCOR and the DOC.94 
In essence, meeting the prongs of the Bonnette test proved 
dispo~itive.~~ The Ninth Circuit panel effectively held the 
State of Arizona liable for not paying minimum wages to state 
prisoners working in the ARCOR program. In reality, the state 
could not help but meet the factors of the Bonnette test because 
of the absolute control it maintained over prisoners in all situa- 
tions-not just those involving inmate labor. Furthermore, the 
court never considered that, by statute, Arizona could require 
inmates to "engage in hard labor for not less than forty hours 
per week? Previously, courts had found this factor enough to 
disqualify the inmates' ~laims.~' Clearly, the Hale I holding 
would have made it difficult for courts to ever justify not ex- 
tending FLSA coverage to prisoners. 
IV. PRISON INMATES NOT STATE EMPLOYEES: 
V A N S ~ K E  V. PETERS AND HALE V. ARIZONA II 
Just two months after Hale I, the Seventh Circuit ad- 
dressed the issue of an inmate's right to receive minimum 
wages from the state." Although the court attempted to dis- 
92. Id. at 1364. 
93. Id. at 1366. 
94. Id. at 1367. 
95. However, failing to meet one or more of the prongs would not have ended 
the inquiry: "failure to satisfy one of the factors is not automatically fatal to a 
worker's claim." Id. at  1364. 
96. ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 31-251(A) (1992). 
97. See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1553 n.7 (5th Cir. 1990) (rec- 
ognizing that "when a prisoner is sentenced to labor as part of his sentence, his 
labor belongs to the prison and is at  the disposal of the prison officials"). 
98. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
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tinguish its case from Hale I,  it still felt the need to rebut most 
of the arguments presented by the Hale I court.g9 
A. The Facts of Vanskike 
Vanskike, an inmate at Illinois' Stateville Correctional 
Center, performed various work assignments for the prison. 
Vanskike claimed to have worked "as a janitor, kitchen worker, 
gallery worker" and other positions while incarcerated.loO 
Vanskike also claimed that the Illinois Department of Correc- 
tions (DOC) did not pay minimum wages for his work.lO' 
Vanskike filed a pro se complaint against the director of 
the DOC. The district court, construing the complaint as an 
FLSA claim, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Vanskike appealed.'" 
B. The Seventh Circuit's Opinion 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first indicated that the Act 
itself provides 'little assistance, and the term 'employee' does 
not obviously include prisoners who perform work within a 
prison."'03 The court also brushed aside the argument that 
employees not specifically "exempted" remain within the Act, 
since that argument "assumes that prisoners plainly come 
within the meaning of the term  employee^.'"'"^ 
The court also attacked the argument that paying prison- 
ers minimum wages is necessary to f!ulfil the purposes of the 
FLEX The court recognized that the primary purpose of the 
Act in providing a minimum standard of living had 'little or no 
application in the context presented. Prisoners' basic needs are 
met in prison."'" In addition, the court rejected the argument 
that the purpose of preventing unfair competition compelled 
FLSA coverage of prisoners, claiming that Congress has al- 
ready adequately addressed that concern by regulating prison- 
made goods through the Ashurst-Sumners Act.'OG 
1303 (1993). 
99. Id. at 808-09. 
100. Id. at 806. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 807. 
104. Id. at 807 n.2. 
105. Id. at 810. 
106. Id. at 811 (citing 18 U.S.C. $8 1761-1762 (1988)). The court presumed 
that since Congress passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1935, Congress certainly 
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Finally, the court declined to  apply the Bonnette test, 
claiming that 
the Bonnette factors fail to capture the true nature of the 
relationship for essentially they presuppose a free labor situa- 
tion. Put simply, the DOC'S 'control' over Vanskike does not 
stem from any remunerative relationship or bargained-for 
exchange of labor for consideration, but from incarceration it- 
self. . . . The Bonnette factors thus primarily shed light on 
just one boundary of the definition of 'employee,' and we are 
concerned with a different boundary.lO' 
The court concluded that, in accordance with the "economic 
reality," Vanskike was not an "employee" under the FLSA. '08 
Furthermore, the court declared that "to the extent that [Hale 
I] may rule that a prisoner working within the prison and for 
the prison is an 'employee' of the prison under the FLSA, we 
respectfully disagree with its concl~sion."'~~ 
While the Vanskike court attempted t o  somewhat lessen 
the effect of the Hale I decision, the Seventh Circuit still left 
the door open for possible FLSA coverage of prisoners. The 
court agreed that "prisoners are not categorically excluded from 
the FLSA's coverage simply because they are  prisoner^.""^ 
C. The Ninth Circuit's En Banc Opinion 
The Hale I opinion raised eyebrows even within the Ninth 
Circuit. In the latter part of 1992, that court reheard the case 
en banc and issued a new opinion on May 4, 1993."' Specifi- 
cally, the court indicated its need to "consider these questions 
en banc to resolve the tension between [its] decision in 
Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., and the panel opinion in 
[Hale 11 ."I l2 
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh 
Circuit's view in Vanskike that the Bonnette factors did not 
provide a useful framework for determining the existence of an 
did not intend to render such a recently passed law superfluous when it enacted 
the FLSA just three years later. Id. 
107. Id. at 809-10. 
108. Id. at 810. 
109. Id. at 809. 
110. Id. at 808. 
111. Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
112. Id. at 1389 (citation omitted). 
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employee-employer relationship.ll3 As in Vanskike, the lack of 
a free labor situation weighed heavily in the Ninth Circuit's 
decision: 
The case of inmate labor is different from [the Bonnettel type 
of situation where labor is exchanged for wages in a free 
market. Convicted criminals do not have the right freely to 
sell their labor and are not protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment against involuntary servitude. . . . "Can these 
prisoners plausibly be said to be 'employed' in the relevant 
sense a t  all?" 
We think not, because . . . the economic reality of the 
relationship between the worker and the entity for which 
work was performed lies in the relationship between prison 
and prisoner. It  is penological, not pecuniary."' 
The court next concluded that  its decision that the inmates 
were not employees "is consistent with the purpose of the 
FLSA.""~ The problem of sub-standard living conditions 
which the FLSA was designed to combat is simply not a con- 
cern for  prisoner^."^ The court further determined that the 
FLSA did not seek to redress unfair competition among goods 
in  the marketplace, but rather unfair competition in the labor 
market."' Although the court was willing to concede that a 
certain amount of unfair competition may result from the use 
of prison labor, 'hothing in the FLSA indicates that that fact 
113. Id. at 1394. 
114. Id. at  1394-95 (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993)). The Fourth Circuit appears to agree 
with this rationale. See Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir.) 
(quoting Vanskike and citing Gilbreath while holding that the FLSA does not cover 
inmates), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 238 (1993). 
115. Hale 11, 993 F.2d a t  1396. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. In support of this position, the court quoted President Roosevelt, Pres- 
ident Roosevelt's Message to Congress on the Fair Labor Standards Act Way 24, 
1937), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 ("And so to protect the 
fundamental interests of free labor and a free people we propose that only goods 
which have been produced under conditions which meet the minimum standards of 
free labor shall be admitted to interstate commerce."), and the Supreme Court, 
Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1950) ("In [the FLSA], 
the primary purpose of Congress was not to regulate interstate commerce as such. 
It was to eliminate, as rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions 
throughout the nation."). The court also concluded, like the Seventh Circuit, that 
Congress "specifically addressed its concern with unfair competition in the products 
market from prison-made goods in the Ashurst-Sumners Act." Hale 11, 993 F.2d a t  
1397 (footnote omitted). 
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alone should convert the relationship between prison and pris- 
oner to one of employer-employee.77118 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized that other policy 
concerns applicable to prison industries programs provide evi- 
dence that Congress would not grant FLSA coverage to prison- 
ers working in such programs.llg "Correctional industries . . . 
occupy idle prisoners, reduce disciplinary problems, nurture a 
sense of responsibility, and provide valuable skills and job 
training."120 Requiring prisons to pay prisoners minimum 
wages without recouping expenses for their maintenance would 
make these work programs economically infeasible. According- 
ly, the court concluded that "Congress cannot have intended 
the FLSA to impose a minimum wage obligation that would 
jeopardize prison industries programs structured by and for the 
For all these reasons, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow 
the panel opinion in Hale I and affirmed the lower court's deni- 
al of FLSA coverage for the prisoners.lP Even so, neither 
Hale II nor Vanskike went so far as to hold that prisoners are 
categorically excluded from the FLSA. Instead, the courts limit- 
ed their holdings to cases of "hard labor," when the prisoners 
are statutorily required to work? Both courts failed to ad- 
dress several other factors and competing policy interests 
which make it unlikely that Congress intended or intends for 
prisoners to be covered by the FLSA except in  the narrowest of 
circumstances. 
V. INTERPRETING THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-DID 
CONGRESS INTEND TO COVER INMATES? 
Part of the difficulty courts experience in  determining 
whether or not inmate workers should be covered by the FLSA 
has resulted from a lack of clear guidance in the Act itself, lack 
of clear guidance from Congress, and the courts7 failure to con- 
118. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1397. 
119. Id. at 1398. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1400. However, Judge Norris wrote a scathing dissent. Id. (Norris, 
J., dissenting). Most of Judge Norris's arguments, as well as those of other propo- 
nents of FLSA coverage for prisoners, are examined in Parts V and VI of this 
Comment. 
123. See id. at 1392-93, 1395. 
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sider some key policy concerns regarding the labor and pay- 
ment of inmates. 
A. Language of the Ad 
The Act defines the term "employer" as "any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation 
to an  empl~yee." '~~ If that circular definition is not very 
meaningful, i t  is made even less so by the Act's definition of 
"employee": "any individual employed by an employer."'* Fi- 
nally, the term "employ" merely "includes to suffer or permit to 
work."lZ6 These broad definitions could include almost anyone 
actually working in almost any capacity, even without expecta- 
tion of payment. Indeed, under these definitions, the FLSA 
should cover anyone suffered or permitted to work by an  em- 
ployer. 12' 
Congress likely intended broad coverage of the Act, but it 
certainly did not intend absolute coverage of everyone.12' This 
is evidenced by the list of "exempted" employees in 29 U.S.C. 
$ 213. On the other hand, Justice Powell's language, indicating 
that  "[s]uch specificity in stating exemptions strengthens the 
implication that employees not thus exempted . . . remain with- 
in the Act,"lZg has fueled the argument that because Congress 
did not specifically exempt inmates in $213, Congress intended 
their inclusion within the Act.130 This general assertion's 
weakness stems from the fact that it presupposes that Con- 
gress contemplated inmates as employees under the Act when 
listing the  exemption^.'^' Logically, Congress would only ex- 
empt those naturally considered to be employees in the first 
instance. 
The plain meaning of the term "employee" also provides 
little insight into Congressional intent. Perhaps Webster's 
124. 29 U.S.C. $ 203(d) (1988). 
125. 29 U.S.C. $ 203(e)(l) (1988). 
126. 29 U.S.C. $ 203(g) (1988). 
127. The federal government "suffers or permits" millions of Americans to work 
for their employers of choice. Can all those workers consider themselves employees 
of the federal government? Clearly, the definitional provisions of the FLSA should 
not be read too literally. 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
129. Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950). 
130. See, e.g., Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 
F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993). 
131. See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. de- 
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993). 
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Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary conveys what Congress in- 
tended, defining "employee" as "one employed by another [usu- 
ally] for wages or salary and in a position below the executive 
level."132 Nevertheless, Black's Law Dictionary recognizes 
that "whether one is an employee or not within a particular 
statute [such as the FLSA] will depend upon facts and circum- 
s t ance~ . " '~  Accordingly, little guidance for the courts can be 
found in the actual language of the FLSA. 
B. Purposes of the Act 
In enacting the FLSA, Congress found the existence "of 
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the mini- 
mum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and 
general well-being of workers."134 According to Congress, per- 
petuation of this first problem led to other problems such as  
unfair competition and labor disputes.'" Congress then de- 
clared that the Act was intended "to correct and as rapidly as  
practicable to eliminate [those] conditions . . . without substan- 
tially curtailing employment or earning power."136 None of 
these purposes, however, compels a conclusion that inmates 
must be paid minimum wages under the Act. 
1.  Sub-standard 1 iving conditions 
The Congress, judges, and other commentators generally 
agree that the need to improve Americans' standard of living 
provided the primary impetus for passage of the FLSA.'~' 
Nevertheless, "the problem of substandard living conditions . . . 
does not apply to prisoners, for whom clothing, shelter, and 
- -- 
132. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (1990). Interestingly, 
Merriam-Webster's concept of an employee parallels that of Congress in many re- 
spects. Congress first chose to exempt "any employee employed in a bona fide 
executive, administrative, or professional capacity" from the minimum wage provi- 
sions. 29 U.S.C. $ 213(a)(l) (1988). This exemption also raises some speculation as 
to the treatment of inmates who labor in executive positions-as in the case of se- 
lected inmates in Arizona's IOBE program. Hale I, 967 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 
1992), rev'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
386 (1993). 
133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990). 
134. 29 U.S.C. $ 202(a) (1988). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. $ 20203). 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22; see also Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 
1396 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing that sub-standard living conditions were the primary 
concern of the FLSA). 
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food are provided by the prison."138 Since the main purpose of 
the Act does not apply to prisoners, a finding that Congress 
intended to cover prisoners under the FLSA runs contrary to 
common sense. 
In  any event, instead of raising inmates' standard of living, 
the requirement of minimum wages could actually lead to few- 
er inmates working and earning any wages. In fact, very few 
states could afford to pay minimum wages to their working 
inmates.13' In all likelihood, states would cut back on inmate- 
work programs rather than incur additional wage expens- 
e ~ . ' ~ '  Such a result would defeat Congress's goal of eliminat- 
ing poor living and working conditions "without substantially 
curtailing employment or earning p~wer."'~' 
2. Unfair competition 
Proponents of FLSA coverage for prisoners most often 
point to the unfair competitive advantage which inmate em- 
ployers gain by paying wages below the statutory mini- 
mum.'" Congress likely intended the FLSA to deter employ- 
ers from trying to make less expensive products through a 
strategy of paying low wages. Even so, while less expensive 
products may be a by-product, this is not the intent of most 
inmate work programs. Indeed, most courts recognize that the 
primary intent of the states is to "occupy idle prisoners, reduce 
disciplinary problems, nurture a sense of responsibility, and 
provide valuable skills and job training."'" With this in 
mind, the Ninth Circuit, in Hale II, was willing to acknowledge 
138. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1396; accord Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807 
n.2 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993). 
139. "A 1992 study by The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit group that special- 
izes in criminal-justice issues, estimated that jails and prisons cost taxpayers more 
than $20 billion a year. . . . 'Corrections is [already] one of the biggest busters of 
state budgets now.'" Ed Timms, Prison Boom a Bust: More Inmates, but Not Less 
Crime, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 17, 1993, at  A1 (quoting Jim Gondles, executive 
director of the American Correctional Association); see also T o q ,  supra note 1, at 
395-96 (describing the large "price tag" for building and operating prisons). 
140. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
141. 29 U.S.C. 8 202(b) (1988). But see Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1401 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1993) morris, J., dissenting) ("The question [of] Congress' concern with the 
harmful effect that cheap labor has on the living standards of all workers [and not 
just prisoners] should inform our interpretation of the statute." (emphasis added)). 
142. See, e.g., Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1400, 1403 (Norris, J., dissenting$; Hale I, 
967 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 386 (1993). 
143. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1398; see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
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that some unfairness would have to  be tolerated to accommo- 
date these compelling interests for putting inmates to 
work. 
In addition, the advantage of paying sub-minimum wages 
is likely offset by added expenses and, in some cases, the lower- 
quality work-product of prison labor. This is certainly true in 
the federal prison system: 
[Mlany believe the cost of inmate labor (an average of one 
dollar per hour) gives [Federal Prison Industries] an unfair 
advantage in the selling prices of products. However, labor 
costs in terms of a percent of the selling price are generally 
the same as that of most private sector operations manufac- 
turing similar products. The reasons are that we focus on 
labor intensive operations, that we hire inmates who have 
little work experience, and that there are many ?hiddenn 
costs, including prison security, a high ratio of "civilian fore- 
men" to inmate workers, and lost product time resulting from 
prison operation requirements.'" 
Presumably, state prison programs experience many of the 
same difficulties as the federal programs in dealing with an 
unskilled labor force which can also represent a security risk. 
Furthermore, the courts have failed to consider the costs of 
providing food, shelter, and clothing for prisoners as part of 
their imputed income. As of 1990, maintaining prisoners in 
federal prison cost about $14,000 a year.146 The cost to state 
prisons likely approaches or exceeds this amount.147 Imputing 
those costs as income to working inmates could be one way of 
getting around the actual payment of minimum wages. 
In any event, the prevention of unfair competition, without 
other compelling rationale, provides a weak argument for ex- 
tending FLSA coverage to prisoners. Requiring payment of the 
minimum hourly wage to working prisoners would not neces- 
sarily solve the problem of unfair competition. In all likelihood, 
the average wage in several competing industries already ex- 
ceeds the statutory minimum. Accordingly, simply requiring 
144. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
145. Hearings, supra note 4, at 11-12 (statement of J. Michael Quinlan, Direc- 
tor, Federal Bureau of Prisons). 
146. Id. at 3 (testimony of Hon. Carlos J. Moorhead). 
147. "The annual cost to operate [state] prisons ranges from $15,000 to 
$50,000 per prisoner per year, depending on the state." Tonry, supra note 1, at 
395; see also supra note 139. 
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employers to pay inmate workers minimum wages would allevi- 
ate, but not cure, this problem of unfair competition of goods 
and labor in the marke tp la~e . '~~  Since prison work programs 
do not experience the same competitive pressures of a free 
labor system as do other public or private employers,'" only 
requiring payment of the prevailing wage in the industry could 
fully solve the problem. In summary, the need to eliminate 
unfair competition fails to provide a compelling reason for cov- 
ering inmates under the FLSA. 
C. Congressional Action and Inaction 
The question still remains whether the failure of Congress 
to exempt prisoners from coverage should be construed as ex- 
press intent to include prisoners in the Act or as an oversight 
on the part of Congress. Hale I followed the former proposi- 
tion,l5' while Vanskike followed the latter.l5l Nevertheless, 
Congress has not acted to include the coverage of prisoners ' 
during the more than forty years in which the courts have 
generally denied it. Congress has had ample opportunity to 
amend the FLSA to include a t  least prisoners working for pri- 
vate industries, if not those working for the states. 
Congress's silence on the matter may be indicative of its 
thinking, or lack thereof, concerning FLSA coverage of inmate 
workers. One possible interpretation is that Congress has 
found the courts' decisions denying coverage to be acceptable. 
Certainly, failure to legislatively counter a court decision will 
be viewed by some as ratification of that decision.15' Howev- 
148. This assumes no extra expenses to employers who use prison labor to 
produce their products. But see supra text accompanying note 145. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 114. 
150. Supra text accompanying note 86. 
151. Supra text accompanying notes 103-104. Compare Mark A. Cunningham, 
Recent Development, Watson v. Graves: Locked into Minimum Wage: Fair Labor 
Standards Act Coverage of Prison Inmates, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1775 (1991) 
(claiming that the Fifth Circuit's "express holding that inmate status does not 
automatically foreclose FLSA coverage resolves the confusion that resulted from 
prior case law which either stated or held that Congress did not intend for the 
FLSA to apply to work performed by prison inmates" (citations omitted)) with 
James J. Maiwurm & Wendy S. Maiwurm, Comment, Minimum Wages for Pris- 
oners: Legal Obstacles and Suggested Reforms, 7 U.  MICH. J.L. REF. 193, 212 
(1973) (citing FLSA legislative history to support the proposition that Congress did 
not intend the FLSA to cover prison inmates). 
152. In fact, those who do not favor completely excluding inmates from FLSA 
coverage have applied a similar argument. See, e.g., Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1392 
n.8 (9th Cir. 1993) (indicating that because "Congress has amended the FLSA twice 
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er, congressional inaction may simply represent a desire to 
leave the matter to the courts; or, it may result from the fact 
that prisoners lack a cohesive and influential lobbying 
voice. '53 
In any event, some courts believe that  Congress's passage 
of the Ashurst-Sumners Act1% represented the extent of legis- 
lative action the lawmakers intended to take concerning prison 
labor.ls5 Congress enacted this particular law to combat "the 
evils attending the sale of [prison-made] goods in competition 
with goods manufactured and produced by free labor."ls6 Re- 
gardless of what Congress intended, "we cannot ignore the fact 
that prison industries programs have existed for a long time, 
Congress has been aware [of these programs] at least since 
passage of the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1935, and important 
penological purposes are served by these  program^."'^' 
Even so, the best evidence of what Congress may intend 
with regard to working state prisoners can be seen in congres- 
sional treatment of federal prisoners. Federal prison work pro- 
grams pay wages well below the statutory minimum.'" If 
Congress allows federal prisoners to be paid sub-standard wag- 
es, it certainly must not object to state prisoners being paid 
sub-standard wages. Unless Congress voices some rationale to 
the contrary, it presumably intends similar treatment of feder- 
al and state inmates. 
D. Public Policy Toward Criminals 
The courts have also failed to consider a number of other 
public policy concerns regarding prisoners. For example, schol- 
since [the Carter holding] without taking action to limit [it,] congressional silence 
on the applicability of the FLSA to prisoners is some indication of its intent"). 
153. One commentator has suggested that Congress enacted the FLSA because 
the "political elites" conceded to pressures from the working class. RONNIE 
STEINBERG, WAGES AND HOURS 14 (1982). Steinberg believes that the working 
a class's power to influence government or employers is the result of organized labor. 
Id. at 179-81 (claiming that organization begets power and power begets reform). 
Since working inmates lack the power to organize to the same extent as private 
labor, the inmates also lack the power for reform. 
154. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1762 (1988). 
155. See Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1397; Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 812 (7th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993). 
156. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1397 (quoting S. REP. NO. 906, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1935)). 
157. Id. at 1398. 
158. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 4, 11-12. 
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ars have voiced several policy reasons supporting the impris- 
onment of criminals, including rehabilitation, incapacitation, 
retribution, and deterrence.15' 
Rehabilitation of criminals is arguably served by allowing 
prisoners to work;160 however, the payment of prisoners for 
their labor is usually not considered essential to this goal. The 
rehabilitative benefit comes from the job skills acquired, the 
responsibility learned, and the self-esteem gained by the in- 
mate worker through prod~ctivity. '~~ Similarly, incapacita- 
tion is not affected by paying wages to inmate workers. Either 
way, the criminal remains incarcerated, hopefully unable to 
harm society. 
On the other hand, paying prisoners for their labor clearly 
contradicts the goal of retribution. Requiring "hard labor" may 
be considered part of the criminal sentence.16z In any event, 
allowing prisoners to earn even meager wages while living a t  
the expense of the state clearly lightens their punishment, a t  
least economically. 
Even so, a more compelling policy argument against the 
payment of minimum or normal wages to prisoners is that such 
payment reduces the general and specific deterrent effects of 
incarceration. Indeed, Professor James Wilson has recognized 
the view that "crime will be more frequently committed if, 
other things being equal, crime becomes more profitable com- 
pared to other ways of spending one's time."163 
159. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME passim (1977). 
160. See supra notes 7-8, 143 and accompanying text. 
161. See DAVID J. CHERRINGTON, THE WORK ETHIC passim (1980). 
162. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, 
$ 1 (emphasis added); see, e.g., ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 31-251(A) (1992) (granting 
state official authority to require that each able-bodied prisoner engage in hard 
labor). 
163. WILSON, supra note 159, at  117. One scholar suggests that a potential 
criminal 
would compare the hourly wage rate in his best legal occupation com- 
pared with the amount he could earn iri his best criminal activity. . . . 
[A] major factor in the costs of crime is the opportunity cost of foregone 
legal wages. . . . An individual would also consider the direct costs and 
occupational expenses associated with crime: the probability of being ar- 
rested, of being convicted, and punished. 
MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, CRIME BY CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68 (1985). Al- 
lowing prisoners to be paid for work in prison reduces this "direct cost" of pun- 
ishment, increasing the likelihood that an individual will engage in criminal acts. 
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Paying criminals for their labor while in prison certainly 
makes incarceration seem less severe from an economic stand- 
point. If criminals know that if they are caught and convicted 
they can still have gainful employment while living off the 
state, the deterrent effect of imprisonment is seriously 
weakened.164 Accordingly, increasing the wages of working 
inmates to the statutorily required minimum would further 
increase the likelihood that a person will undertake crime for 
its potential economic benefits. 
This proposition seems especially true in light of evidence 
that crimes are more likely to be committed by unemployed 
persons who would stand to benefit economically from either 
perpetrating crime or prison employ~nent. '~~ Also, substan- 
tially more property crimes are committed annually than vio- 
lent crimes,'66 further indicating a possible connection be- 
tween criminal behavior and the need for property or economic 
gain. 
Several scholars have developed models to support this economic hypothesis on 
a much more complex and scientific level. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J .  POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Sheldon 
Danziger & David Wheeler, The Economics of Crime: Punishment or Income Redis- 
tribution, 33 REV. SOC. ECON. 113 (1975); Isaac Ehrlic, Participation in Illegitimate 
Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J .  POL. ECON. 521 (1973). 
Indeed such views were espoused more than a century ago: "[Mlen will resort to 
plunder whenever plunder is easier than work. History shows this quite clearly. 
And under these conditions, neither religion nor morality can stop it." FREDERIC 
BASTIAT, THE LAW 10 (Dean Russell trans., 1950) (1850). 
164. This analysis obviously ignores other psychological viewpoints on criminal 
behavior. See generally WILSON, supra note 159, at  47-70. Certainly, mentally un- 
stable individuals will be less likely to consider the economic prospects of criminal 
behavior. Nevertheless, "[tlhe evidence supports the idea that criminals are rational 
and responsible for their own behavior." REYNOLDS, supra note 163, at  75. 
A similar economic theory underlies much of the rationale behind tort liability 
as well. See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ! ~ X ~ T S  
25-26 (5th ed. 1984). The theory is that "[a] reasonable person will take care to 
avoid an accident as long as the cost of taking care is less than the cost of the 
accident to that person. Accident cost is a function of the gravity of the harm the 
accident will cause . . . and the probability that the accident will happen." Sharon 
E. Conaway, Comment, The Continuing Search for Solutions to the Drinking Driver 
Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 NW. U .  L. REV. 403, 420 
n.111 (1988). 
165. See CHARLES H. MCGAGHY, CRIME IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 65 (1980); RICH- 
ARD QUINNEY, CLASS, STATE, AND CRIME: ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CRIMI- 
NAL JUSTICE 50-60 (1977). 
166. Reynolds claims that "over 90 percent of the crimes recorded by the police 
involve thefts and robberies." REYNOLDS, supm note 163, a t  68; see also CRIME 
REPORTS, supra note 2, at 5. 
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Certainly Congress has considered this in its regulation of 
Federal Prison Industries and other prison work programs 
which still pay sub-minimum wages to inmates. Congress could 
not approve a program which would so strongly undermine 
public policy towards criminals while only marginally further- 
ing the goals of the FLSA?? 
VI. A NEW TEST FOR ECONOMIC REALITY 
In light of the fact that Congress likely did not, and would 
not, intend for the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover working 
prisoners in  a majority of cases, the courts must find a way to 
interpret the Act in a logical and consistent manner. The Su- 
preme Court has held that the coverage of any given relation- 
ship hinges on the "economic reality'' of the employment situa- 
tion.lq Several courts have developed tests for determining 
the "economic reality" of the employment situation, but the 
Ninth Circuit's Bonnette test has become the most p0pu1ar.l~~ 
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Second17' and Fifth 
Circ~its '~ '  have apparently also adopted the test. 
Even so, the Bonnette test is flawed, failing to adequately 
recognize "economic reality" in several situations. Applied liter- 
ally, most inmate workers would gain coverage under the 
FLSA. This is because the Bonnette test really only focuses on 
whether the employer (or group of employers) perform em- 
ployer-like functions over the inmate worker. The inmate is 
held to be an employee by virtue of the entity paying the wages 
being held to be an employer. However, this does not always 
comport with reality.'" 
Accordingly, this Comment proposes a new test which 
considers both the employer and employee sides of the relation- 
ship: an  employee covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act is a 
person who, (1) while free to sell his or her labor to another 
167. See the text accompanying notes 143-144 for a brief discussion of other 
compelling policies which require inmates to work. 
168. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51. 
170. Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984). 
171. Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (5th Cir. 1990). 
172. See Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
Bonnette factors do not provide a useful framework in the case of prisoners who 
are statutorily required to work); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th-Cir. 
1992) (stating that the Bonnette factors presuppose a free labor situation which 
does not exist), cert. denied, 113 S .  Ct. 1303 (1993). 
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party (2) in reasonable expectation of standard compensation, 
(3) provides services for or on behalf of a party (4) who has 
power to hire or fire the person, (5) who supervises and con- 
trols the person while working, and (6) who determines the 
rate and method of payment to the person. 
Under this test, workers must be free to sell their servic- 
e~~~~ and must reasonably expect compensation. Three 
Bonnette factors are still included to determine who the actual 
employer is.175 Clearly, this test more closely reflects the eco- 
nomic reality of a true employer-employee relationship. 
Under the test, inmate workers could never be employees 
of the state or prison for FLSA purposes. Inmates are not truly 
free to sell their labor to a party who not only can decide the 
terms of their employment but also can govern their entire 
daily routine. In other words, the state's "control over [an in- 
mate] does not stem from any remunerative relationship or 
bargained-for exchange of labor for consideration, but from 
incarceration itself."176 "[Tlhe economic reality of [this] rela- 
tionship . . . lies in the relationship between prison and prison- 
er. It is penological, not pe~uniary." '~~ This is especially true 
when inmates are required by state statute to work, but it 
applies equally to any situation in which the state or prison 
can establish the terms of employment or pays the inmate 
worker.17' 
173. Steinberg contends that, though the contrary may seem true, freedom of 
contract was the source of the FLSA's philosophical foundation. STEINBERG, supra 
note 153, at 8. 
174. This requirement would eliminate the possibility of volunteer workers 
later trying to demand payment from those on behalf of whom they volunteered 
their services. In addition, inmates would have no reasonable grounds for expecting 
minimum wages from the prison or state. If the employer is private, the result 
may change. 
175. Bonnette's fourth factor, the keeping of employment records, should never 
be a dispositive factor. However, the fact that records are kept for a particular 
individual may provide valuable extrinsic evidence when other factors do not 
clearly point to one employer or another. 
176. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 1303 (1993). 
177. Hale 11, 993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993). 
178. The situation in which it is easiest to conceive of an inmate who could be 
held to be an employee under FLSA involves an inmate who has been given per- 
mission to contract with outside employers on a work-release basis. However, these 
situations are relatively few in comparison to all inmate labor situations. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
While some courts seem likely to extend FLSA coverage to 
prisoners in several cases, the courts' actions are not supported 
by the Act or by congressional intent. Congress's inaction to- 
wards state prisoners and the FLSA should be viewed as ap- 
proval of the traditional denial of coverage by the courts until 
1984. In addition, competing policies regarding treatment of 
prisoners makes i t  unlikely that Congress would approve of 
such coverage, even today. Unless Congress or the Supreme 
Court provides more specific guidance, the courts should apply 
this Comment's proposed test for economic reality. 
James K. Haslam 
